Autonomous Reform versus Global Isomorphism: Explaining Iran’s Success in Reducing Fertility

Masoomeh Khandan and Lant Pritchett

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Autonomous Reform versus Global Isomorphism: Explaining Iran’s Success in Reducing Fertility

Masoomeh Khandan
Lant Pritchett

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Abstract

A long-standing literature in the sociology of organizations (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983) suggests that, as change agents face uncertainty about actions and outcomes, they often seek legitimacy through isomorphism: adopting structures, policies and reforms similar (at least in appearance) to those deemed successful elsewhere. We examine history’s most rapid reduction of fertility—from 8.4 in 1985 to 2.4 in 2002, in rural Iran—as an example of successful autonomous reform. The Iranian state, which was self-consciously cut off from nearly all of the traditional vectors of global isomorphism, initiated a successful behavioral change in a domain (family planning) perhaps unexpected for an Islamic state. We describe and explain the Iranian approach, in particular the rural program, contrasting it with the global strategy of adopting universal “best practices.”

1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and should not be attributed to the organizations with which they are, respectively, affiliated. Email address for correspondence: Masoomeh Khandan (masoomeh.khandan@gmail.com)
1. Introduction

The idea of “development” as a distinct field of thought and action was in many ways born out of the end of (explicit) colonialism and the emergence, in the aftermath of World War II, of a large number of newly independent states. While these states were politically sovereign, they were embedded in a global system that constrained and affected their choices. This global system had newly constituted organizations—such as the United Nations and its affiliated agencies (e.g., ILO, WHO), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (and later regional development banks), and international agreements that created reciprocal obligations (such as the GATT). Also, there were a variety of developmental associations, both governmental—e.g., the emergence of bilateral aid agencies in many OECD countries (e.g., USAID, DFID)—and private associations and foundations. Over and above each country’s own domestic pressures and initiatives, it was these organizations (and others) that comprised the "global cultural and associational processes” that Meyers et al. (1997) argue shaped the structures, policies, and practices of developing country nation-states.

The “development decades” of 1950 to 2010 have been, in many dimensions, the best of times; indeed, many indicators of human well-being improved more in those 60 years than in the previous 6,000 years of human existence. The average schooling completed in developing countries was two years in 1950 and rose to 7.1 by 2010 (Pritchett 2013). Life expectancy rose from 35 and 41 years in India and China in 1950 to 67 and 77 in 2010 respectively—indeed, an improvement in India of 32 years almost doubled life expectancy. And material destitution, as measured by a penurious poverty line such as the “dollar a day” standard, has declined from well over half the world’s population in 1950 to less than 10 percent today.

And yet, other dimensions of development, notably the creation of effective agencies and organizations of the nation-state, have seen less progress and some stunning reversals. Data on “state capability” (an aggregation of ratings of characteristics like “government effectiveness”, “control of corruption”, “bureaucratic quality” and “rule of law”) in 2012 showed that of 102 developing countries with available data, 49 countries had “weak” or “very weak” capability, and that between 1996 and 2012 an additional 31 countries had seen deterioration in their capability—so 80 percent of developing countries in 2012 had either weak capability or declining capability (or both) (Andrews et al. 2017).

One of the potential explanations of persistent failure in state capability is that the global system, often with international development actors as the vector, encourages isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991)—that is, in order to create and convey legitimacy, national governments officially adopt “best practice” reforms but have neither the interest nor capability to actually implement them. Isomorphism can be used to sustain flows of external financing and secure domestic credibility (and to avoid censure), yet lead to little or no actual improvement in functionality. A symptom of isomorphism is a convergence in form but a large and sustained divergence in function. In schooling, for example, there has been rapid progress in the years of schooling children complete but a continued divergence in whether children acquire skills in school. A recent study using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data showed that, among adult women who completed grade 6, the fraction who could read a single simple sentence in their native language varied from near zero—only 3.5 percent in Sierra Leone—to near 100 percent—97 percent in Rwanda (Pritchett and Sandefur 2017).
There is similar isomorphism in adopting reforms aimed at improving aspects of the operation of the nation-state, such as public financial management (PFM). Andrews (2009) shows that the internationally promoted “best practices” in PFM were widely adopted across Africa, but the reforms adopted were those for which isomorphism is the easiest: a country could get good grades (and countries were literally graded on their adoption by international agencies) without actually changing anything that mattered about how state resources were actually deployed. Isomorphism can reach extremes: Uganda has recently rated the best country in the world for processes and procedures pertaining to controlling corruption—while remaining in the bottom quarter in rankings of its actual control of corruption (Andrews and Bategeka 2013). 2

An alternative to isomorphism is a “positive deviance” approach, in which looks for locally generated successes: i.e., circumstances in which people, communities or nation-states produce success without having access to additional resources or influence from external actors. The “positive deviance” approach was first pioneered in public health, particularly nutrition, with an emphasis on identifying households who had superior nutrition outcomes even with the same resources and in the same circumstances in which malnutrition was widespread. The programmatic use of positive deviance strategies centers not on adopting “best practices” from abroad but identifying the local practices on the basis of observed successes and encouraging their adoption by others through local communities of practice (Singhal et al. 2009). The Problem Driven Iterative Adaption approach to building state capability (Andrews et al. 2017) seeks to build and consolidate a positive organizational dynamic that harnesses positive deviance using iterative feedback loops to produce the construction of adapted solutions.

In this paper, we explore a striking example of positive deviance. The reduction in the total fertility rate in Iran from above 6 in 1986 to below 3 in 1996 was the fastest such reduction in fertility in recorded history. This is a striking example of positive deviance in several respects. After 1979, Iran’s revolutionary government deliberately cut itself off from the “global cultural and associational processes” (i.e., from the standard vectors of isomorphism). Moreover, Iran's government was strongly Islamic, and the standard isomorphic approach to fertility reduction in the global field of family planning had often been publicly resisted by some (though not all) governments in Islamic states and often actively resisted by Islamic clerics. Tackling fertility reduction in Iran was an autonomous reform process; it was not induced—either in objectives or methods—by external pressures for compliance with global “best practices” or isomorphism.

The paper proceeds as follows. Following this Introduction (Section 1), Section 2 describes the features of the successful family planning program in Iran. Section 3 then contrasts this approach with the tensions that resulted from attempting to promote the adoption of the globally dominant approach to family planning. Section 4 explains and explores the broader implications of this analysis. Section 5 concludes.

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2 Promoting fitness education is another example. In many countries, students are required to exercise at schools at least weekly. Ministries of education, school officials, and principals want to follow the international fashion of "physical education" and by pledging to promote it can get funding to upgrade their sports facilities and hire instructors. However, the instructors often neither know how to teach nor motivate the desire for physical activities in their students; as a result, students spend years literally going through the motions but in the end, neither enjoy fitness nor build skills.
2. Iran’s National Family Planning Program: Origins, Design, Implementation

The pace and extent of the reduction in fertility in Iran are remarkable, particularly when compared with other countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Figure 1 shows that Iran is the world’s leader in the pace of fertility reduction from above 6 to below 3, taking only 10 years (1986 to 1996), versus the 70 or more years of historical transitions and even the 20 years or more of countries with rapid economic growth and transformation such as Turkey, South Korea, or Brazil.

Figure 1: The fertility transition from above 6 to below 3 was only ten years in Iran—the fastest in history

How long did it take for fertility to fall from more than 6 children per woman to fewer than 3 children per woman?

![Fertility Transition Graph]

When compared to other predominantly Muslim countries from 1989 to 2002, we see that Iran went from being precisely average, at TFR of 5, to a TFR of 2.0, lower than Muslim countries, which fell on average to 3.5, and Iran’s fertility in 2002 was lower than the world average of 2.6.
Figure 2: Total Fertility Rate in Iran fell from 5 to 2 from 1989 to 2002—twice as fast as the average of other predominantly Muslim countries

To restrict population growth, the Iranian government changed course from the pro-natal policies adopted after the 1979 revolution to endorsing fertility limitation and family planning. At the center of Iran’s family planning strategy was its Health Network System (HNS), which in time earned international praise for its innovative structures, practices and impact (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2006; Abbasi-Shavazi et al 2007), all the more so because the outcomes achieved occurred in an Islamic state previously famous for its strong adherence to a pro-natal and conservative Islamic ideology (Obermeyer 1995). The program has been branded an “Iranian miracle” (Mehryar et al. 2001) and is admired as a potential model for other Islamic countries (such as Pakistan; see Boonstra 2001).3

The achievements of the rural component of Iran’s family planning program are especially instructive. The design of its rural clinics and the choice of service delivery modalities were the most innovative (see discussion below) and generated the most significant declines in fertility. Rural areas had been unaffected by attempts at fertility reduction before the 1979 revolution, but within 15 years, the rural fertility rate fell from about 8.4 in 1985 to about 2.4 births per woman in 2002. Contraceptive prevalence rates in rural areas rose from 20 percent in 1976 to 67 percent by 2000, marking Iranian families among the highest contraceptive consumers in developing countries (Mehryar et al. 2001). In conjunction, the infant mortality rate declined from 92 per 1,000 in 1980 to 32 per 1,000 in 2004. While urban fertility also fell by half and fell below the replacement level, the large gap in fertility between the urban and rural

areas was nearly eliminated by 2000. Finally, the pervasiveness of the program’s rural components was especially notable, as about 90 percent of the country’s rural population (more than 20.4 million rural people across 4.2 million households) were covered by the program by 2005. There were some 16,560 health houses (see below) run by 26,403 health workers and connected to 2,321 rural Health Centers in about 55,000 villages (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2010).

Moreover, while the typical economic approach focuses on the impact of reductions in family size on increasing the quality of ‘human capital’ in later generations (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973), Iran’s fertility transition had immediate impacts on young women who stayed in school longer because they expected to have fewer children. Villages which got a health clinic from 1986-1996 increased adult rural women literacy 4-8% faster than those which got a clinic after 1996; within a single generation, young rural women tripled the average number of years they attended school. Correspondingly, the literacy rate of rural women of childbearing age increased from about 10% to more than 75% (Salehi-Esfehani 2012).

Pritchett (1994) demonstrates that, across countries, realized fertility is very strongly correlated with women’s expressed desired fertility. He argues that changes in contraceptive behaviors are best seen as a response to changes in the desired childbearing of couples and women, not as a response to the availability of contraceptive access per se. A clear implication is that governments seeking to reduce fertility should change the economic, education, and social conditions that make small families desirable and by shifting norms of family size. Iran’s effort to reduce fertility levels manifestly demonstrates this point: namely that reducing fertility is best achieved through a broad approach to improving economic and social conditions in general, and for women in particular. This includes improving women’s educational, health, and economic status as well as their general role and place within society.

How did Iran’s Health Network System achieve these remarkable outcomes? Our answer to this question—which draws on the existing literature, primary interviews (with key policy participants) and secondary data sources—is organized by analyses in three domains: (a) local problem construction (i.e., how and why high fertility came to be seen not as a “condition” but as an addressable “problem”); (b) program design; and (c) program implementation (and implementers).

(a) Local Problem Construction

After 1979, having stopped the Shah’s family planning program, the new Islamic government showed no interest in family planning and instead implemented pro-natal policies. By 1986, the census duly showed a record annual rate of population growth: 3.9% since the previous census (conducted ten years earlier, in 1976). The baby boom happening from around 1979 led to considerably larger cohorts of children entering primary schools, which were utilized in two and three shifts in the mid-1980s (Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani 2013).

In 1989, one year after the end of the Iran-Iraq war Iran’s national planning and budgeting organization held a conference in Mashhad (Iran’s most religious city) to which all relevant policymakers and 48 involved agencies were invited to inform and discuss the issue of high

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4. Of course, there are everywhere differences among couples about the desired pattern and pace of childbearing and these affect contraceptive choices and realized fertility (e.g., Ashraf, Field, and Lee 2014).
5. This was 3.6 percent, excluding Afghan and Iraqi refugees.
fertility. Additionally, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, asked seminaries to explore an array of possible solutions to the high fertility challenge. The seminaries, in turn, made suggestions and gave them to the parliament to evaluate; the parliament then delivered its chosen policies to the government. In summary, due to the many demands that needed to be met to support a large and rapidly expanding population of young people, the government decided to adopt an anti-natal policy and implement family planning programs (Salehi-Isfahani 2009)—crucially, however, not those programs that were in vogue elsewhere in the world at the time (see below), but ones based on their own articulation of solutions to their own understanding of the problem(s) before them.

(b) Program Design

There were certain aspects of the family planning program that had national impact, such as the removal of implicit child subsidies, and aspects that were specific to rural areas, the most important being the active delivery of family planning services, which all women in a given geographic area received through “health houses”. The government had begun to build health houses in rural areas in the early 1970s, but only a few had been built by the Revolution in 1979. When the government was promoting population growth, it expended significant resources to establish a network of health clinics across Iran’s rural areas. These clinics focused on providing services for mothers and children, but these services did not include family planning. In 1985, new legislation to improve health infrastructure within rural areas mandated the Ministry of Health to rapidly increase the construction of health houses. Construction peaked in 1989, at the same time the new family planning program to reduce population growth was signed into law (Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani 2013).

The Hashemi Rafsanjani administration that was in power from 1989 to 1997 had a crucial rule in the construction effort. When family planning became law in 1989, health house construction reached its highest level and started offering family planning services in addition to just mother and child health services (Salehi-Isfahani 2009). Before the Revolution, the Shah began the construction of rural health houses, and the program continued after 1979, but with important changes. Post-Revolution, the program was much farther reaching: in 1972 the original program had estimated that, countrywide, 2,450 clinics were needed to ‘provide good access’ (Moore 2007), whereas the post-Revolution program sought and achieved the building of more than 18,000 rural clinics (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2010).

The other fundamental difference was that the new family planning program had a more effective communication campaign. There are three key elements of that greater effectiveness.

The first element was that it was built on a highly popular and expanding program already serving rural families called the Health Network System (HNS). The HNS focused on providing services for mothers and children, excluding family planning. As a result of the program’s legitimacy, when family planning was introduced it was viewed as part of a broader suite of rural development services rather than more narrowly as simply an attempt to control

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6 Interview with officials.
7 In passive delivery, women seek health services from clinics, while in active delivery, health workers themselves search for individual women who need health services.
their population growth. The HNS initially focused on “better lives”, and in so doing gave credibility to the campaign’s main slogan of ‘fewer children, better lives.’

Second, local health workers were hired and trained to provide active service delivery in villages—that is, they took the initiative to search for individual women who needed health services. If a married woman of reproductive age missed the chance to go to her local health house at least once a year, for example, a health worker would seek her out, and provide her with the required maternal health, childcare, and contraceptive services. The health worker recorded and updated her information in a database that contained health information for every single married woman aged 15-49. This database, called Zeej, was maintained by the HNS and was updated annually (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2009).

Third, the fact that clergy supported the program at the national and local levels increased its effectiveness, at least to some extent. Iran's family planning program was influential in reducing rural fertility because of its large size and the fact that in 1989 contraception moved from a subject of official opposition—or, at best, benign neglect—to one of active endorsement and support (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2010). A shift in the desired number of children is intrinsically a process of shifting social norms, and in this case required framing the reduction in family size in explicitly Islamic terms and achieving it in ways consistent with Islamic norms.

(c) Program Implementation (and Implementers)

In 1984, the Ministry of Health was mandated to construct simultaneously the health network in one district in each of the 25 provinces (currently 31 provinces) and then gradually cover other districts in each province, ultimately expanding to all 180 districts (now 429 districts). Districts were chosen based on the capability of their local administrators such as provincial governors, mayors and town councils, and the availability of educated women to be hired, trained and employed as health workers. Formerly women were required to have a minimum of primary education, but later requirements included lower secondary education. The Ministry of Health started the construction of a rural health center in the capital city of each province to monitor the performance of several health houses. In main villages, the health houses provided services for about 1,500 households and several satellite villages nearby, while mobile units were used for those in outer settlements. Two local health workers who were trained for one year served in each health house (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2010).

Health houses and family planning program in villages not only provided contraceptives but also helped to empower women by changing historic social norms, which saw reproduction as women’s primary role in their family. As a government service devoted to women, Iran’s HNS lent the weight of authority to the changing social acceptability of rural women’s role within the family structure and larger society as one that was more equal to men. These norms were already prevalent in the more urbanized areas of the country (Salehi-Isfahani 2012).

The advent of family planning has resulted in women’s empowerment and significantly altered the social structure of families. The government decided to make broad social changes since the decision to utilize family planning was made at the community, family and individual level within society. The programs had to be designed and implemented taking into account the local social norms since specific contraceptives had strong social impacts. Young couples were
influenced by their parents and other relatives in deciding how many children to have (Salehi-Isfahani 2012).

To reduce fertility, the government concentrated on the diffusion of information about fertility preferences and contraceptives. This diffusion was based on a communication campaign which included discussions about participants’ desired fertility. These discussions themselves influenced changes in how norms were expressed and behavior was rationalized. These changes in methods of communication itself contributed to change in norms and resulting actions based upon the norms. Of course, social influence is critical in determining the fertility rate and whether it is rising or falling. The government was able to capitalize on social influence factors to affect individual thoughts, perceptions and resulting behaviors. Individuals usually desire the acceptance and approval of their peers, family, friends and those in authority positions in their life such as religious leaders. Indeed, this desire for acceptance and approval is so important that individuals are wiling to modify their thinking and behaviors to achieve acceptance. Once fertility preferences were changed, health service providers simply offered additional information about the types of available fertility control (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996).

The government’s focus on maintaining and improving the well-being of low-income rural areas conveyed the idea that the program was benign and legitimate. Before family planning becoming an official policy in 1989, the HNS solely focused on the health of mothers and children. Given this history, experience, and resulting trust that rural families had with the providers, it is highly likely this was a factor in these same families’ positive reception and belief that it was the government’s intention with the new policy to improve their lives rather than simply limit their population. The durability of this trust was important for the program's credibility (and thus impact). In addition, local health workers were recruited and trained from the local population that they would be serving. As a result of this, once the national communication drive was fully mobilized, most of the intended audience was likely already receptive to its main slogan of ‘Fewer Children, Better Life’. The national campaign for smaller families had additional programs and features beyond the services provided by the rural clinics, and these were especially effective due to the support and endorsement they received from the clergy8 (Salehi-Esfehani et al. 2010).

The campaign emphasized the opportunity to invest more in each child within small families rather than higher numbers of children in a large family. This hinted at the government’s focus on child education and the potential benefits for families. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, consistently described the Revolution as belonging to the poor, many of whom lived in the rural parts of the country. The Revolution’s consistent emphasis on serving and empowering the (rural) poor in the new Islamic Republic, linked with the campaign’s promise of health and family planning services, might have been a deciding factor in rural families across the country deciding to shift their cultural practice from high fertility and low investment in their children to low fertility and high investment even before those services had arrived (Salehi-Esfehani et al 2010).

In 1989, several changes in government policies were enacted that have affected fertility. First, the government simply announced that support for large families would soon be reduced. Second, the family size-based rationing of essential commodities was removed; receipt of rations was no longer based on how many children a family had. Third, the government threatened

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8 The role of the clergy was very important in Iranian life post-revolution and Iran’s government structure.
removal of all subsidies for the fourth child (and any additional children) including health and education subsidies for elementary through university. By 1993, a law was passed limiting the benefits from numerous government programs to three children. At the same time, educational opportunities in rural areas were improving, raising families’ expectations of higher returns on education for their children, decreasing the desire for larger families (Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani 2013).

Iran’s family planning program has not had a significant effect on the age at which women first give birth; it has only affected higher-order births (Abbasi Shavazi et al. 2009). Across Iran, but especially in rural areas, marriage is seen as a rite of passage and this rite of passage is only concluded with parenthood. The time between marriage and first birth did not materially change after the family planning policy. However, the space between the first and second births and the second and third births clearly increased, which was matched by the decline in fertility over time. So, the government’s strategy respected the cultural importance of marriage and parenthood (Salehi-Esfehani et al. 2010).

This enduring timing of when women first give birth, despite the availability of various contraceptive methods, indicates that a couple’s decision regarding when to have their first child (namely, as soon as possible) remained unchanged. It was after the first child that contraceptive methods were applied. This indicates that contraceptive means is not the sole determinant of fertility rates, rather it is the timing of the desire for fertility. According to the most reliable studies on the subject, the presence or absence of family planning programs explain less than 5 percent of fertility levels in developing countries (Pritchett 1994). Demeny (1979) similarly demonstrates that in countries all across the world, fertility began declining prior to the establishment of any family planning programs. In our recent past and now, the significant declines in fertility are due to corresponding significant declines in desired fertility, not to any reductions in excess fertility.

In summary, to reduce fertility, the government changed the economic, education, and social conditions that made small families desirable. Iran’s experience clearly proves that reducing fertility is best seen as a broad problem of improving economic and social conditions, especially for women: raising their levels of education, their economic position, their health, and their role and status in society and shifting norms for desirable family size. This needn’t be a transition driven by first changing female labor force participation. Figure 3 shows the trend of female labor force participation in Iran which indicates that it only began to rise well after the fertility transition was well underway.
Figure 3: Iranian female labor force participation rose from 10 to 20 percent, but well after the fertility transition was underway.

The Ministry of Health was mandated by law to decrease the national fertility rate. They implemented the program in those (few) districts which had strong administrative capacities, willingness to cooperate, and human and infrastructure resources to implement the program. Local people were used to deliver services. Also, the government supported the program by changing some laws, getting clergy and the founder of the Islamic Republic to support the program, implementing a national propaganda campaign using various media, allocating required resources for implementation, collecting data, and delivering better education and health services to people. Via active service delivery, frontline service providers were deployed to deliver the required services. Informing people about the problem and communicating the policy to them were two critical aspects of the program, which involved people in the policy implementation. In other words, the people and the government implemented the program together. All stakeholders were aligned to make a sustainable change across the country. The United Nations Fund for Population Assistance has highlighted Iran’s example of how a strong political commitment can bring about major changes in population and reproductive health in record time (Salehi-Isfahani 2009).

3. Comparing Iran’s Approach with that of Other International Initiatives

In the decades preceding 1989, reducing population size was a defining objective of development policy, with the adoption of ‘family planning’ technologies and techniques regarded as the primary means of achieving it. As such, ‘family planning’ constituted a global domain; it was (and in many respects remains) a clear “field” that combined research, think tanks, and foundations with the academic training of professional ‘experts’ and front-line practitioners.

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9 http://web.unfpa.org/countryfocus/iran/family.htm
While of course there were many variations within this global field, family planning was characterized by specific widely accepted beliefs that constituted its core assumptions.

First, there was a belief that population growth and high fertility were large (even existential) threats to the globe, to national development and the health and well-being of women and children. Exemplifying these fears, in 1973 the President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, likened the threat to humanity of rapid population growth (‘explosion’) to that of nuclear weapons. This created intense pressure for developing countries to adopt demographic target-driven family planning programs, some of which were consistent with, but in other ways inconsistent with, a maternal and child and reproductive health-driven approach (see below).

Second, there was a widespread belief that some large part of high fertility was due to inadequate access to modern contraception and that making available contraception widely available at low cost would, in and of itself, causally lead to substantially lower population growth. This was accompanied by a corresponding presumption that there was “unmet need” (a term we return to below) for contraception and that desire to limit total fertility was already widespread but unrealized due to the high costs of adequate contraception.

Together, these factors led to a dominant “best practice” model that used stand-alone family planning programs combining (a) a mix of demographic and mother and child well-being targets with (b) an expanding supply of contraception and “information and communication” elements. Connelly (2008) estimates that by 1980 about $2 billion had been allocated for population programs plus $490 million in international aid in developing countries. This was supported by a global movement in foundations (e.g., Ford Foundation), special purpose think tanks (e.g. Population Council, Population Reference Bureau), and official donors (e.g. USAID, World Bank) that operated as central hubs for the dissemination of "best practices" in family planning.

This dominant model created tensions and contradictions between the push for adopting “best practice” demographic-target-driven programs, and the actual local social and political conditions. These contradictions then worked themselves out in different ways, leading in one direction to coercion and in many Islamic states to the outright rejection of the programs because the idea of fertility reduction through contraceptive use could not be disentangled from the individualist and secular ideology embedded in the dominant model.

We briefly discuss three high-profile initiatives that exemplified the prevailing global “best practice” approach in the 1980s: Bangladesh’s Matlab region experiment, India’s family planning crisis during the Emergency period, and China’s one-child policy. All three cases illustrate both the limitations and dangers of adopting the standard approach to fertility reduction, and serve as an instructive comparison with the Iranian approach during this period – an approach largely shielded from these global pressures for isomorphism, which afforded it the space to forge its own more context-appropriate strategy, one that turned out to be vastly more successful in achieving a similar policy objective.

**Bangladesh’s Matlab Region Experiment**

Bangladeshi women during the mid-1970s were having an average of more than six children. This, combined with a lack of proper nutrition and low-quality health services, negatively
affected both the mother’s and her children’s health. In addition to the adverse health effects, the high fertility and resultant rapid population growth were thought to be restraining the country’s economic and social advancement. A study of the adoption of aggressive family planning stance in Bangladesh points to both the demographic factors (including the famine of 1974, interpreted as a Malthusian harbinger) and explicitly to external influence (via “technical and financial assistance from international organizations”) as promoting causes (Hasan, Reich, and Fink 2012).

In 1977, the Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health Services Project was implemented by the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Research in the Matlab district of rural Bangladesh. Central to this experiment was a very intensive expansion in the availability of contraception. Prior to the experiment, contraception costs for women in the Matlab region were very high. Many women had limited access to contraception outside the home due to the practice of *purdah*. Hence the costs of obtaining information and contraceptives were substantially high (DeGraff 1991).

The Matlab program lowered both of these costs as much as possible. Contraceptives were furnished free of charge and delivered directly to women’s homes, avoiding the need for travel outside the home as well as any time needed to pick them up. A wide variety of contraceptives were provided and used. Twice a month a project employee visited every married woman of childbearing age in the village. Several years into the project, these workers also began promoting maternal and child health practices, including tetanus toxoid immunization for women, measles vaccinations for children, and oral rehydration salts for diarrheal diseases (Muhuri 1995). These employees were recruited from local villages and were usually married, well educated, from influential families, and themselves users of contraception. These health workers advised women regarding their contraceptive requirements and actively promoted the adoption of contraception. Matlab deliberately recruited educated, leading village women as employees to overcome both the costs in travel outside the home and time in a traditional society and to reduce the social and family disapproval of contraception (Joshi and Schultz 2007). But the total program effect was only 14 percent fewer children ever born in the “treatment” versus “control” villages (Sinha 2005) or the cumulative fertility or "surviving children" were only 15-20 percent lower in the treatment villages (Shareen and Schultz 2007).

The experiment in the Matlab region shows both the potential but also the limitations of the “contraceptive services” paradigm in which it is presumed that fertility reduction can be motivated and sustained by reductions in the costs of contraception. While there were clear and demonstrable reductions in fertility, this was only achieved starting from very high levels of access costs (due to social and market conditions) being reduced to the lowest possible levels with intensive and expensive programs. The total impact of say, 15 percent in fertility of the pure impact of the differential “treatment” versus “control” access to contraception (which is somewhat conflated with countrywide expansion of policies that affected the "control" villages) could account for a reduction from 5 to .85*5=4.25 or .75 births compared to the actual decrease in Iran from 5 to 2.

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10 CASE 13: Reducing fertility in Bangladesh (Center For Global Development 2005).
India’s Experience

Early efforts at family planning in India were undertaken in the 1960s, but the issue received relatively little political attention or support at the top. The 1971 population census recorded its all-time high average annual population growth rate of 2.26 percent (Chaurasia and Singh 2014), and Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister; in due course her son, Sanjay Gandhi, became responsible for family planning.

The family planning programs in India were initially launched on the presumption that increased access to contraception would lead to widespread uptake and rapid reductions in fertility. However, the programs often emphasized sterilization as the most "cost-effective" form of contraception, one that required less continuous supply and less attention to matching supply of methods to demand (Ramesh et al. 1996). The sterilization campaign starting in the early 1970s was based on a “camp” model; the program was not rooted in improvements in basic public health or improved pre- and postnatal health care, nor was it integrated into the healthcare system (Rao 2004), but rather was driven by targets and used monetary incentives to raise “compliance” rates.

In the Emergency period, after Indira Gandhi seized extraordinary powers, the pressure on governments to meet contraception targets became even stronger. In 1976-7, the program reached 8.3 million sterilizations, 2.7 million more than the previous year’s record (Haub and Sharma 2006). The pressure on the state governments to meet these targets was enormous. During this period the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh sent the following cable:

“GOVERNMENT ATTACH HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVEMENT OF FAMILY PLANNING TARGETS (.) PRESUME YOU HAVE ALREADY FIXED TARGETS FOR EACH DISTRICT AND DIVISIONAL LEVEL OFFICER (.) INFORM EVERYBODY THAT FAILURE TO ACHIEVE MONTHLY TARGETS WILL NOT ONLY RESULT IN STOPPAGE OF SALARY BUT ALSO SUSPENSION AND SEVEREST PENALTIES (.) GALVANIZE ENTIRE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY INTO ACTION, REPORT DAILY PROGRESS BY CRASH WIRELESS TO ME AND SECRETARY TO CHIEF MINISTER….”11

Historical accounts of this period (Connelly 2008, Angus and Butler 2011) report that sterilization became a pre-condition for receipt of critical, basic needs such as land allotments, irrigation, electricity, water, ration cards, medical care, rickshaw licenses, promotions, and pay raises. If school teachers, for example, didn’t meet their quota they could be demoted, fired, or even threatened with arrest. These teachers in some cases expelled students if their parents did not sterilize. All employees across the nation—from senior government bureaucrats to train conductors and policemen—were given a sterilization quota they had to achieve from those under their authority. This created a nationwide market for citizens to buy and sell (sometimes multiple times) their capacity to reproduce the targets. This use of coercion to meet sterilization targets created a backlash that many attribute to Gandhi’s Congress Party losses in the elections of March 1977.

Needless to say, the role of the global pro-family planning international foundations and aid agencies in creating the conditions in which the widespread demographic target-driven

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coercive practices emerged and were carried out, is hotly disputed. Connelly (2008) argues that these were the entirely predictable consequences of programs for contraception that were (a) motivated by demographic control, (b) driven by hard targets for contraception uptake, and (c) delivered in camp mode. He argues that in fact many of the international organizations were well apprised of the situation during the Emergency period, did little or nothing to stop it, and in fact continued support to India during the entire episode. In any case, the Indian case illustrates the dangers of the clash between global isomorphism and local conditions.

China’s Experience

The experience of China illustrates in even more draconian terms than the Emergency in India how the global discourse around demographic dangers can, when politically unconstrained by citizen resistance, move beyond voluntary to forced use of contraception. The Chinese government intently observed the global argument regarding a potential catastrophic global overpopulation as conjectured by organizations like the Club of Rome and the Sierra Club. On a visit to Europe in 1979, Song Jian, a top Chinese government official, acquired a number of influential books that made these dire predictions, including *The Limits to Growth* and *A Blueprint for Survival*. Under the direction of Song, a team of mathematicians calculated the ‘correct’ population of China to be 700 million in order to limit the demands on resources and to alleviate social, economic and environmental problems. The Chinese then developed the One Child policy that attempted to slow a surging population by limiting families to one child (Zubrin 2012). The fertility rate was reduced from 2.7 births per woman in 1981 to 1.5 births in 1998.12 Family planning committees for each province determined the allowable number of births per woman. A woman pregnant with a second child was pressured to undergo an abortion, and if she didn’t abort, the child would receive reduced rations and have his/her educational opportunities restricted (Connelly 2008).

In 1977, before the advent of the One Child policy, family planning programs included mobile teams who would perform sterilization and IUD implantation. Also, there were various incentives and disincentives, including organized peer pressure. China’s program was expanding into an example of total integration that was even more aggressive than India’s during the Emergency Period. Brigade, production teams and street committee leaders were all ordered to closely monitor women of childbearing age. Some of these groups forced women to take gynecological exams each month and made reports on these women’s menstrual cycles. Incentives for women to opt for an abortion included 14 days of paid vacation or 40 days if the abortion was in the second trimester and followed by sterilization. There were other incentives and disincentives depending on the province. Rural areas proved problematic because having a son was crucial to security in old age. Families and the larger community hid offenders of the policies. Others temporarily moved during pregnancy or gave the baby to relatives (Connelly 2008).

Where incentivized compliance was high, the government was unable to support their promised benefits and people could not receive those promised benefits. Officials reacted to this development by releasing crash drives in which ‘shock teams’ led by senior bureaucrats moved through rural areas, village by village, reinforcing the local medical staff to perform more IUD

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insertions, abortions, and sterilizations. These teams also badgered local personnel and singled out lawbreakers. In 1979 alone, China recorded 7.9 million abortions, 13.5 million IUD insertions, and almost 7 million sterilizations, an increase of 44 percent in total medical procedures over the year before (Connelly 2008).

China’s One Child policy was developed on its own, with little input from any foreign organization, despite the more general influence described above during Song Jian’s visit to Europe in 1979. However, the UNFPA and the IPPF, conflicted regarding their future and urged by their donors, extended their aid to China despite multiple ringing alarms regarding what they were getting into. In 1983 the UNFPA set up three training centers. The IPPF presented a $9 million program to equip 290 family planning centers for marketing, education and technical guidance. This coincided with the most coercive time in China’s One Child policy. A former major general in the People’s Liberation Army Xinzhong Qian led the program. All women with a child had stainless steel, tamper-resistant IUDs implanted. All parents with two or more children were sterilized, and any unauthorized pregnancy was aborted. The birth of a third child was not allowed under any circumstance. The UNFPA, despite worries that the new policy might cause significant issues for the United Nations, declared its support for “a very explicit regulation that all couples with a second child must be sterilized.” (Connelly 2008)

In 1983 over 16 million women and over 4 million men were sterilized in China. Almost 18 million women had IUDs inserted, and more than 14 million had abortions (Baird 2011). From 1983 onwards, the entire government was to be marshaled to stop all population growth by 2050. In this context, it is predictable that both the IPPF and UNFPA assisted China in implementing the One Child policy. The UNFPA went so far as to honor Qian with the first-ever United Nations Population Award. Indira Gandhi was a co-winner. When the winners came to New York to be honored, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said of them: "Considering the fact that China and India contain over 40 percent of humanity, we must all record our deep appreciation of the way in which their governments have marshalled the resources required to implement population policies on a massive scale." (Connelly 2008)

At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, in Cairo, the global consensus in the field of family planning shifted decisively away from family planning programs driven by demographic concerns and targets towards a reproductive and child health approach. The four lessons were that (a) demographic target-driven programs, by their very nature, risked the use of coercion and bureaucratic abuse; (b) such programs were often at odds with the actual demand for contraception for multiple purposes like delay of first birth and spacing (as permanent methods like sterilization were more cost-effective for limiting total births); (c) the integration of family planning into a maternal and child health driven strategy was more likely to be successful in the long run than a "stand-alone" family planning program structure; and (d) respect for women and men’s fundamental rights to make choices and respect for their norms, cultures, traditions and religious beliefs should not be overridden by top-down concerns based on national population targets.

4. Lessons of Autonomous and Isomorphic Approaches to Family Planning

The notion of “development” itself is susceptible to an interpretation in which “developing” countries are expected to accept and adopt “solutions” or “best practices” as a means of improving the well-being of their populations. However, global normative isomorphism can
produce both positive impacts (e.g., pressures for adoption of human rights protections, elimination of war crimes) but can in some instances create a situation in which “the solution is the problem” (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004), inducing countries to adopt externally developed programs and policies not due to their locally validated impact but as a means of attracting external support and legitimacy through the isomorphic projection of “form” that does not produce the "function." This can prevent the emergence of local positive deviations and the construction of performance-based systems and hence to capability traps (Andrews et al. 2017).

Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran’s government has neither sought nor received international agencies’ support. This freed it in a variety of domains from seeking external support or legitimacy and reduced the vectors of isomorphism. This isolation from the world has forced Iran to define and explore its own solutions to its own locally nominated problems. While we are obviously not endorsing everything the Iranian government has done over this period, it is worth looking at how it succeeded so spectacularly in a domain that is perhaps unexpected for an Islamic regime: family planning.

In the following short sections, we first illustrate how the lack of external support allowed Iran to create a pro-Islamic approach to family planning. We then show the contrast with Iran’s program and the dominant approach via the lens of PDIA.

(a) Fertility Reduction and Islam

The case of fertility reduction in Iran illustrates that opposition can be created that is not profoundly intrinsic but is instead a product of the artificial association of a field with particular solutions or best practices. Indeed, Iran’s program was explicitly motivated by a notion that fertility reductions could be motivated by, consistent with, and conducive to Islamic values. The canard that Islam and fertility reduction were incompatible was driven by global approaches to “best practice” that unnecessarily bundled features and program design elements that inhibited uptake.

In Indonesia, simmering Muslim opposition led administrators to scale back efforts to promote family planning. In March of 1976, however, government decision-makers decided to press on with the sterilization program. Four months later, reports that the US ambassador had opposed demands to acquiesce to additional deliveries of contraceptives resulted in harsh, attacking editorials in the Indonesian press. People were told that the distribution of contraceptives would “destroy their tradition and morals. Sex would become the most important thing as in the Western countries and the U.S.” (Connelly 2008)

In March 1977, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was attacked by an opposition alliance for promoting family planning, who called it “a filthy business and against the spirit of Islam”. This opposition alliance pledged to change every family planning clinic into health dispensaries. Bhutto used the family planning staff and vehicles to get out the vote, and he subsequently claimed election victory, though his opponents rejected the purported results and demonstrated. Months later, supported by the Muslim League, General Muhammad Zia ul Haq overthrew Bhutto and by 1980, the new regime was refusing international family planning assistance, and Pakistani children used surplus condoms as balloons.
Despite such cases, other observers stress that there is, in fact, no opposition to contraception in the Quran, and that it articulates no particular view on the desirable number of children a family should have. The Quran, they note, asks men and women to determine the number of children they desire and the timing of their children’s births based on the family’s physical, financial, and cultural situations. The family is one of the most critical aspects of a society and children have rights to live and enjoy adequate facilities; accordingly, parents should consider these facts, and draw on them to form their own fertility desires and plans. Such views, needless to say, have not curtailed the efforts of either opponents or supporters of family planning from providing different interpretations of the Quran to reinforce their arguments. However, it is much harder to argue that the Quran can be interpreted as supporting abortion and many Muslims consider particularly late-term abortion as akin to murder. While support for abortion is entangled into some versions of support for family planning in some countries and among some advocates, it is not an intrinsic element of projects for fertility reduction.

In short, population growth per se is not an Islamic principle. Family planning can be a political tool, and a large population can be considered a strategic political advantage. Since Muslims were a few in the number 1400 years ago, Islam’s clergies promoted higher fertility rate among their followers. One important argument against family planning is that limiting the number of Muslims weakens Islamic societies. Pakistan’s Molana Madodi, for instance, strongly opposes family planning, arguing that contraception undermines Islam’s power, destroys family culture, and gives permission to women to work in society.

However, the Iranian view was that there was a pro-family and pro-motherhood argument for fertility reduction and family planning, and that while the dominant global approach to family planning may bundle a variety of views, freedom from isomorphic pressures created a space for recognizing that family planning is not a singular ‘package’ that must necessarily be accepted or rejected wholesale.

Sometimes, the illegitimacy of family planning program is determined by the balance of power between religious parties and the government, not by religious rules and ethics. For instance, in Egypt during the Naser/Sadat/Mubarak period, most religious parties were against the ruling governments. The government set a program to control the country’s high fertility rate and tried to persuade religious networks to support it. However, some religious parties were against the government and openly communicated their opposition to the program. Similarly, before Iran’s revolution, religious parties opposed the Shah’s family planning program and supported the anti-family planning agenda. Iran had one of the highest fertility rates in the world. After the Iran-Iraq war, however, it was possible for the Iranian government to convince most religious parties and clergies to actively support the family planning program since it benefited the country (Tadayyon 1994).

Iran's family planning program provided different contraception methods; however, it did not alter the first childbirth. Young couples preferred to have their first child soon after their marriage. After having the first child, they then adopted contraception (Salehi-Esfahani et al. 2010), showing that completed fertility is determined by much more than the mere accessibility of contraception. As the demographer Paul Demeny (1979) has mentioned, fertility was declining in countries “from Malaysia to Mauritius, from Taiwan to Trinidad,” before any family planning programs were adopted or implemented. Put differently; the world has experienced incredible declines in fertility not because of increased contraception, but because of remarkable
declines in desired fertility. Such a change requires shifts in social norms, which can be congruent with other existing norms – and can perhaps be more widely and rapidly adopted – when this approach is taken.

(b) Problem Driven through Local Nomination

A crucial feature of Iran’s distinctive approach to family planning was that problems were nominated and prioritized for attention via either a bottom-up or a top-down process – but neither problems nor solutions were adopted in a search for external legitimacy. The ability to construct the problem locally allowed greater flexibility in creating sufficient authorization among relevant actors to implement a correspondingly local solution. It was particularly important for eliciting the strong support of the Islamic clergy, affording the program the space needed to define the key issues and approaches in ways that could be construed as pro-Islamic. A high profile national conference with clergy about population issues was an integral part of the problem construction process since their support – or resistance or indifference – could be crucial in communicating a shift in social norms compatible with Islamic values.

Consensus building among selected groups of politicians and decision-makers is an important feature of policy making in Iran. To gain attention, agents are forced to support their arguments by different approaches, such as providing measures to construct the problem in politically and socially acceptable ways. In so doing, agents can see the complexity of the problem and challenge themselves to find solutions; in due course, a consensus is reached among politicians and policymakers to nominate a problem and seek a solution that solves it. Such steps are important in contexts where change encounters opposition, and where the context is complex and uncertain. As Andrews et al. (2013) argue, broad participation in complex decisions can produce greater legitimacy and generate higher rates of diffusion once actions to address the problem have been decided upon.

Such processes generate policy and institutional solutions that emerge iteratively over time rather than fully-formed from the outset. This encourages novelty but requires a robust authorizing environment within which key decisions are made since the necessary flipside of innovation is failure. Robust authorizing environments can provide windows to potential entry points to address the problem, but not every plausible solution will be a successful one; failure will be a constant companion (which no organization likes, not least public ones). By focusing on solving local problems (not adopting external, uniform solutions), organizations are incentivized to emphasize taking incremental and informative steps; this is especially important in uncertain and complex contexts, where reformers are unsure (by definition) of how to solve the problem and how to get (and maintain) peoples’ support.

(c) Experiential Learning and the Iterative Feedback Loops

One of the dangers of adopting a pre-formed “solution” based on global “best practice” is that the strong assumption that “the solution” will be effective if implemented with fidelity hampers the ability to be adequately open to collecting data and feedback loops about effectiveness. The global family planning field explicitly advocated the concept of “unmet need” – which appeared to imply that there was a large pent-up demand for contraception services and hence that, if they were made available, the uptake would be rapid. To some extent, this notion of "unmet need"
itself discouraged collecting and acting on the information that would suggest that the demand by
women and men for contraception was more complex and contingent than the suggestion of a
"need" might suggest.

Table 3 shows the reported levels of “unmet need” in the earliest DHS survey for a set of
Muslim majority countries. “Unmet need” is not self-reported by women but is a variable that is
constructed by imputing a “need” for contraception to all women who reported not wanting a
child now who were not using modern contraception. None of these women told a surveyor they
“needed” contraception; their “need” was imputed to them by others. The reported high levels of
“unmet need” might suggest that many women were not using contraception because their
“need” was a “demand” (i.e., they actually wanted to use contraception) but were blocked from
doing so by a lack of access or knowledge. However, elsewhere in the same DHS survey women
who were not using or intending to use contraception were asked: why not? Their answer
revealed that women had many reasonable and legitimate reasons for not using contraception,
such as the fact that they were menopausal or infecund or they had concerns about side effects or
were just opposed to using it for religious or other reasons. In fact, even in the earliest surveys
(in which family planning programs may not have reached their full extent)
"access/knowledge/cost” was typically a very small category; in all but Pakistan, the smallest
category for reasons of non-use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DHS Survey Year</th>
<th>Unmet need (constructed variable, not self-reported by women)</th>
<th>Percent of married women who do not report they “want more children” by the reasons they give for not intending to use contraception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>2.2% 60.5% 27.2% 7.1% 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>1.2% 59.9% 6.8% 15.0% 15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>11.7% 40.0% 12.8% 13.2% 19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>6.9% 40.0% 19.9% 31.0% 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>21.1% 25.1% 37.3% 7.5% 8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2.6% 79.7% 5.4% 3.9% 6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>14.6% 18.5% 39.3% 25.5% 1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: STATCompiler.
a) Access/knowledge/cost (aggregate of 6 responses):
lack of knowledge, knows no method, knows no source, lack of access, costs too much, inconvenient
b) Fertility/sex related (aggregate of 4 responses):
infrequent sex, menopausal/hysterectomy, sub or infecund, post-partum amenorrhea, other fertility related.
c) Opposition (aggregate of 5 responses):
respondent opposed, spouse opposed, religious prohibition, others opposed, other opposition to use
d) Health-related (aggregate of 4 responses):
health concerns, side effects, interfere with body, other method related.
By this logic, if one believed that 22.9 percent of Egyptian women had an "unmet need" for contraception it would be plausible to expand supply on the supposition that demand was present and hence supply would increase use. In fact, programmatic efforts might only closely track money spent and clinics built and workers hired, as these were measures of supply. But if one knew that only 1.2 percent of women who were married and did not want children were themselves reporting not using contraception because of access issues, then one might construct entirely different means of promoting uptake – like addressing opposition, providing methods and with means that addressed health concerns – and have a program focused on learning how to do those well. This might be a case where the stringencies of global advocacy to create and sustain the resource flows into the domain of family planning efforts actually worked at cross-purposes with creating locally effective programs.

In contrast, although Iran’s program was not necessarily "bottom-up" it was nevertheless entirely locally constructed and driven. This allowed the government the latitude to construct the problem consistent with contextual realities, organize frontline workers and other stakeholders to implement the policy and create feedback loops not beholden to a global discourse.

5. Conclusion

This article tries to explain how developing countries can reach the ultimate goals of development practices by themselves. Their efforts to build their state capabilities can be realized without depending on external legitimacy and support. Furthermore, to be able to help developing countries in development paths, development agencies should change their approaches regarding their interventions. The key logic here is that the process of local development should be carried out by local agents in the local context. Such an approach helps developing countries to escape from isomorphic mimicry and capability traps (Andrews and et al. 2013), which otherwise restrict the space for empowering decision-makers and frontline implementers to enhance the state’s capabilities; with the space for novelty closed, they have to follow predetermined best practices.

The paper posits that, in the absence of external pressures to comply with global “best practice” for the purposes of securing funding and/or legitimacy, Iran has been able to respond to its understanding of its family planning problems by defining them in politically supportable and practically implementable ways, using the space afforded by its very isolation to pursue reforms compatible with its own social norms and religious sensibilities – reforms that, in less than a decade, achieved history’s fastest recorded decline in fertility. Of course, countries seeking to forge their own path to lower fertility levels would do well not to cast what became (the visible form of) Iran’s strategy itself as a “best practice”, but rather to find and fit their own locally supportable solution to their own understanding of what constitutes their problem.

References


### Appendix 1. The analytical structure of Iran’s family planning program in rural areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>National Family Planning Program in Rural Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform description</strong></td>
<td>The Hashemi Rafsanjani administration that was in power from 1989 to 1997 had a crucial role in the family planning program and construction effort. When family planning became law in 1989, health house construction reached its highest level and offered family planning services to about 90 percent of Iran’s rural citizens. The rural Iran experienced the history’s most rapid reduction of fertility—from 8.4 in 1985 to 2.4 in 2002. Contraceptive prevalence rates in rural and urban areas rose from 20 and 54 percent in 1976 to 67 and 77 percent respectively by 2000. In conjunction, the infant mortality rate dropped from 92 per 1,000 in 1980 to 32 per 1,000 in 2004. Iran’s fertility transition had immediate impacts on young women education, and within a single generation, the literacy rate of rural women of childbearing age increased from about 10% to more than 75%. These changes drove Iran's rural in a uniquely modern direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem construction</strong></td>
<td>The 1986 census showed a record annual rate of population growth of 3.9 percent since the previous census in 1976. The baby boom happening from around 1979 led to considerably larger cohorts of children entering primary schools, which were utilized in two and three shifts in the mid-1980s. In 1989, one year after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s national planning and budgeting organization held a conference to which all relevant policymakers were invited to be informed and discussed the issue of high fertility. Additionally, the founder of the Islamic Republic asked seminaries to explore an array of possible solutions to the high fertility challenge. As a result, due to the many demands that needed to be met to support a large and rapidly expanding population of young people, the government decided to adopt an anti-natal policy and implement family planning programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical capability to design policy</strong></td>
<td>The seminaries made suggestions and gave them to the parliament to evaluate. The parliament assigned the Ministry of Health to decline the state fertility rate, and by 1993 passed a law to constrain the implicit child subsidies to three children. In 1984, the Ministry of Health was delegated to construct simultaneously the health network in one district in each province and then gradually cover other districts in each province, ultimately expanding to all districts. The Ministry of Health started the construction of a rural health center in the capital city of each province to monitor the fulfillment of several health houses. They began the program in a few districts, which had strong administrative capacities, willingness to cooperate, human and infrastructure resources to implement the program, and available educated women to be hired, trained and employed as health workers and provide active service delivery in villages. If a married woman of reproductive age missed the chance to go to her local health house at least once a year, for example, a health worker would seek her out, collect new information, update her information in a database that contained health information for every single married woman aged 15-49, and provide her with required services. Family planning program was across this health service to mother and children. The programs were designed and implemented taking into account the local social norms. For instance, across Iran, but especially in rural areas, marriage is seen as a rite of passage and this rite of passage is only concluded with</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 The sources of information are provided in the context of the paper.
parenthood. The time between marriage and first birth did not materially change after the family planning policy. However, the period of time between the first and second births and the second and third births increased. Also, the government decided to make broad social changes since the decision to utilize family planning was made at the community, family and individual level within society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical and managerial capability to implement policy</th>
<th>The government orchestrated some interventions such as allocating required resources for implementation, collecting data, and delivering better education and health services to people. In 1989, several changes in government policies were also enacted that have affected fertility. First, the government just announced that support for large families would soon be reduced. Second, the family size-based rationing of essential commodities was removed. Third, the government threatened removal of all subsidies for more than four children including health and education subsidies for elementary through university. At the same time, educational opportunities in rural areas were improving, raising families’ expectations of higher returns on education for their children, decreasing the desire for larger families.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• New ways to bring variety, local approaches of doing things and local capacities and resources, into a connected whole that has the potential to lead to the institutional transformation</td>
<td>Before family planning becoming an official policy in 1989, the HNS solely focused on the health of mothers and children. Given this history, experience, and trust that rural families had with the providers, this was a factor in shaping families’ positive reception and belief that the government’s intention with the new policy was to improve their lives rather than simply limit their population. The durability of this trust was important for the program’s credibility (and thus impact). Also, local health workers who were recruited and trained from the local population added to local trust. As a result, once the national communication drive was fully mobilized, most of the intended audiences were already receptive to its main slogan of ‘Fewer Children, Better Life’. Informing people about the problem and communicating the policy to them were two important aspects of the program, which were especially effective due to the support and endorsement they received from the clergy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mechanisms for knowledge sharing and learning (Inputs into an iterative process of the formation of institutions)</td>
<td>Health houses and family planning program in villages not only provided contraceptives but also helped to empower women by changing historic social norms, which saw reproduction as women's primary role in their family. As a government service devoted to women, Iran's HNS lent the weight of authority to the changing social acceptability of rural women's role within the family structure and broader society as one that was more equal to men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Policy support by beneficiaries and people (who shape the output)</td>
<td>• Changes in social norms and institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2. The summary of Bangladesh, China, and India experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program</strong></td>
<td>Matlab, based on decreasing contraception costs</td>
<td>One Child Policy</td>
<td>Mandatory Sterilization to stop large families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in Fertility Rate</strong></td>
<td>Fertility rate decreased from 6.6 in 1976 in all over the country to 3.2 in 1995 in experiment’s regions and has sustained the lower level ever since.</td>
<td>Fertility rate decreased from 3.51 in 1977 to 2.65 in 1985 and remained relatively constant to 1988.</td>
<td>Fertility rate decreased from 5.1 in 1976 to 4.8 in 1980 and 4.4 in 1986, and this trend stretched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coverage</strong></td>
<td>This experiment was run in an approximately 70 rural villages with the same conditions as those in Matlab district</td>
<td>Across the country</td>
<td>Across the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involved Organizations</strong></td>
<td>International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research (ICDDR)</td>
<td>UNFPA and IPPF</td>
<td>FPAI, USAID, WB, and UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanation</strong></td>
<td>Contraceptives were provided free and delivered to the home. Educated village women who were trained by the program, recruited to provide continuous contact and support to visit every two weeks each currently married, childbearing age woman. Community health workers consulted women regarding their contraceptive needs and encouraged them to adopt contraception. Women could overcome the costs of obtaining contraception in a traditional society and reduce the disutility of side effects.</td>
<td>All women with one child had to insert a stainless-steel, tamper-resistant IUD and all parents with two or more children had to sterilize. All women in childbearing years were closely monitored, and unauthorized pregnancies were aborted. They needed to submit their monthly gynecological exams and post reports on their menstrual cycles. Given that by understanding a baby's gender, fertility rates could reduce, the ultrasound machines were installed more inclusively in rural areas.</td>
<td>In April 1976, a comprehensive plan was designed to increase the incentive for sterilization. Sterilization became a condition for land allotments, irrigation water, having house, electricity, ration cards, rickshaw licenses, medical care, pay raises, and promotions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
<td>This experiment was expensive and could not be implemented across the country.</td>
<td>Women with unauthorized pregnancies were receiving injections resulting in stillbirths or early infant death. Every day hundreds of fetuses arrived at the morgue. The birth of girls had led to abuse of mothers and infanticide. A shift in the ratio of women to men happened.</td>
<td>Governance razed slums, forced sterilizations, and intimidated and imprisoned opponents. Some were killed by police when they defended villages. This policy resulted in poverty in the countryside. Along with this program, more than half of unwanted pregnancies were aborted under unsafe conditions, and hundreds were being killed from botched sterilizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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14 The sources of information are provided in the context of the paper.